NEVILLE JAMES STYNES AND BARBARA STYNES v WESTERN POWER (EAST MIDLANDS) PLC
Decision date: 19 July 2013
Neutral citation: [2013] UKUT 214 (LC)
Overall AI summary confidence: high
Short overview
This short overview is intended to summarise the case, issues and outcome so far as they are supported by the judgment.
AI confidence in this short overview: high
This appeal concerned whether paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 to the Electricity Act 1989 entitles owners to compensation under section 44 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 for injurious affection caused by off‑site apparatus (notably pylon HK34). The Tribunal held that a necessary wayleave under Schedule 4 is a statutory licence/consent, not a taking or proprietary interest invoking s.44, so compensation is confined to loss attributable to the grant itself. Applying that, the agreed lower figure of £4,000 was awarded for injurious affection; costs and interest were dealt with as recorded.
Ratio decidendi
This summary is intended to identify the ratio decidendi, meaning the legal reasons for deciding and the binding part of the decision.
AI confidence in this ratio decidendi summary: high
A necessary wayleave granted under Schedule 4 creates a statutory consent/right of occupation but does not constitute an acquisition or taking of land for the purposes of the 1845 Act or section 44(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1973; consequently s.44 does not apply to the retention of pre‑existing works or to apparatus situated solely on land not owned by the claimant, and paragraph 7(1) compensation is limited to loss attributable to the grant.
Obiter dicta
This summary is intended to identify obiter dicta, meaning observations made by the way that were not necessary to deciding the case and are not binding.
AI confidence in this obiter dicta summary: medium
The Tribunal indicated (obiter) that the principle of equivalence governs assessment within the statutory scheme but cannot be used to enlarge the statutory entitlement under paragraph 7(1) to include losses not flowing from the grant itself, and that airspace intrusion authorised by consent remains trespass absent the consent but does not amount to expropriation engaging s.44.